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NOTES
TORTS-Mowry v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 129
Wis. 2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986).
In Mowry v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co.,1 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that an insurance company which
refused to settle an injured party's claim against its insured
within policy limits did not act in bad faith and therefore was
not liable for the excess judgment against its insured.2 Crucial
to its decision was the court's finding that the coverage ques-
tion was a fairly debatable one.
In so ruling, the court declined to embrace the strict liabil-
ity doctrine imposed on insurers in some jurisdictions.3 The
court reasoned that the adoption of this theory would force
insurers to settle doubtful claims and thereby contravene Wis-
consin's bifurcation statute,4 which allows the issue of cover-
age to be determined before issues of liability and damages are
1. 129 Wis. 2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986).
2. Id. at 526, 385 N.W.2d at 185. The court also held that Badger State did not
breach its duty to defend its insured. Id. at 527-30, 385 N.W.2d at 185-86. However,
this issue is contractual in nature and will not be the focus of this note.
3. See generally Note, Excess Liability of Insurersfor Bad Faith Refusal to Settle: A
Boon to the Individual Insured that Works to the Detriment of Consumers, 18 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 377, 385-87 (1984) (discussing a trend approaching strict liability).
4. Wis. STAT. § 803.04(2)(b) (1985-86) provides:
If an insurer is made a party defendant pursuant to this section and it appears at
any time before or during the trial that there is or may be a cross issue between
the insurer and the insured or any issue between any other person and the in-
surer involving the question of the insurer's liability if judgment should be ren-
dered against the insured, the court may, upon motion of any defendant in the
action, cause the person who may be liable upon such cross issue to be made a
party defendant to the action and all the issues involved in the controversy deter-
mined in the trial of the action or any 3rd party may be impleaded as provided in
§ 803.05. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting the trial
court from directing and conducting separate trials on the issue of liability to the
plaintiff or other party seeking affirmative relief and on the issue of whether the
insurance policy in question affords coverage. Any party may move for such
separate trials and if the court orders separate trials it shall specify in its order
the sequence in which such trials shall be conducted.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tried.' However, the import of Mowry is to force the conse-
quences of an insurer's mistaken judgment on its insured.
This note will briefly trace the development of the tort of
bad faith and then analyze the Mowry decision.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bradley Mowry was injured in an automobile collision
while a passenger in a car driven by Steven McCarthy. Mc-
Carthy's parents were insured by Badger State. Their insur-
ance coverage had policy limits of $15,000 for damages to any
one person and $1,000 for medical coverage.
Mowry subsequently filed suit against McCarthy, McCar-
thy's parents, Badger State, and an insurance agent. Badger
State responded with an answer which denied that McCarthy
was covered by Badger State.6 The parties agreed to a bifur-
cated trial during which the issue of coverage would be deter-
mined before any trial concerning the issue of liability.7
Before the coverage trial, Mowry extended numerous of-
fers of settlement for the full policy limits to Badger State.
Badger State, however, refused to agree to any settlement
before the issue of coverage was tried. Ultimately, McCarthy
was found by a jury to be covered under the Badger State pol-
icy. Judgment was entered accordingly in favor of Mowry and
against Badger State for $16,000 and against Steven McCar-
thy for $175,000. Mowry, suing under McCarthy's assign-
ment of rights, then brought an action against Badger State
for bad faith and breach of contract.
The trial court found that Badger State breached its con-
tract in refusing to defend McCarthy and that it committed
bad faith in refusing to negotiate a settlement. The court
5. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 514, 385 N.W.2d at 180.
6. The court stated:
[Badger State] believed that it was unclear whether McCarthy or his parents
were the true owners of the automobile involved in the accident. Its investiga-
tion disclosed that the car was titled in McCarthy's mother's name, but that
McCarthy had paid for the car with his own money, did not need permission to
drive the car, and had told several people at the scene of the accident that he
owned the vehicle and that it was uninsured.
Moivry, 129 Wis. 2d at 505, 385 N.W.2d at 176.
7. WIs. STAT. § 803.04(2)(b) (1985-86).
8. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 508, 385 N.W.2d at 177. The trial court "was indignant
that an insurer would delay settlement negotiations until the coverage issue has been
[Vol. 70:725
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awarded Mowry damages in the amount of $159,000. 9 Badger
State appealed the trial court's decision, and on certification
from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,10 the case proceeded to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Badger
State neither breached its duty to defend nor acted in bad faith
in failing to settle.I' Consequently, Badger State was relieved
of responsibility for the excess judgment entered against
McCarthy. 2
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH
In the early 1900's, courts were generally unwilling to
force on the insurer a duty to settle on behalf of the insured. 3
The early courts' stance can be attributed, in part, to the fact
that most standard policies were devoid of any express duty to
settle.14 This refusal of the courts to recognize a duty to settle
was short-lived and gradually courts began to characterize the
relationship between the insurer and insured as a fiduciary re-
lationship, giving rise to an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.' 5 Implicit in this approach was the recogni-
tion that a violation of this covenant could support a cause of
action in tort.16
Presently, courts in several jurisdictions use varying stan-
dards to determine if an insurer has breached its duty to the
insured in failing to settle a third-party claim. 17 The majority
judicially determined, particularly when liability and excess damages are undisputed."
Id.
9. Id.
10. Wis. STAT. § 809.61 (1985-86).
11. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 530, 385 N.W.2d at 186.
12. Id. For an excellent discussion of damages resulting from an insurer's failure to
settle and failure to defend, see Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settle-
ment, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1158-67 (1954).
13. Note, supra note 3, at 380.
14. Id.
15. Phelan, The First Party Dilemma: Bad Faith or Bad Business?, 34 DRAKE L.
REV. 1031, 1033 (1985). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing provides that
"neither party will do anything which injures the right of the other [party] to receive the
benefits of the agreement." Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, -, 212 P.2d 878,
881 (1949).
16. Phelan, supra note 15, at 1033.
17. It is important to distinguish between third-party and first-party claims. Third-
party claims generally involve situations where a third-party seeks compensation from
19871
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of courts maintain that an insurer owes its insured a duty of
good faith, while a minority of courts examine the insurer's
conduct towards its insured by employing a negligence stan-
dard.'8 Despite this lack of uniformity, courts in different ju-
risdictions agree that an insurer may be liable for a judgment
against its insured in excess of policy limits when it unreason-
ably fails to settle a third-party claim within policy limits.' 9
In Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co. ,20 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action aris-
ing from the bad faith conduct of an insurer. The Hilker
court compared the insurer's duty to that of a fiduciary 2' and
asserted that in a third-party claim situation, the insurer must
exercise good faith in the investigation and settlement of a
claim against its insured. 2
Similarly, Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.23 also
recognized the tort of bad faith. Anderson, however, broad-
ened the scope of this newly-recognized tort to encompass
the tortfeasor's insurer. First-party claims generally describe situations where the in-
sured recovers benefits from his own insurer without establishing fault.
18. Note, supra note 3, at 382-85. Under the negligence standard, the insurer must
use the degree of care in settling third-party claims that a reasonable insurer would
exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Id. The distinction between the bad
faith standard and the negligence standard has been minimized with the adoption of a
dual standard by some courts. The dual standard requires that good faith be used in the
decision to settle, but that ordinary care be used in the insurer's investigation of such a
decision. Keeton, supra note 12, at 1141-42.
19. Phelan, supra note 15, at 1035.
20. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413
(1931). For a discussion of the tort of insurer bad faith in Wisconsin, see Note, Bad
Faith - Tort Victim has No Cause of Action Against Tortfeasor's Insurer for Bad Faith
Failure to Settle the Victim's Claim, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 463 (1982). See also Kranzush
v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
21. Hilker, 204 Wis. at 6, 231 N.W. at 259. See also Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9
Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
22. Hilker, 204 Wis. at 14-16, 235 N.W. at 414-15. The Hilker court found that the
duty to act in good faith imposed two settlement-related obligations on the insurer.
First, the insurer must "make a diligent effort to ascertain the facts upon which only an
intelligent and a good faith judgment may be predicated." Id. at 15, 235 N.W. at 415.
Second, the insurer must inform the insured when it becomes aware of the fact that
recovery could exceed policy limits. Id. at 15-16, 235 N.W. at 415. A third obligation
of the insurer to keep the insured timely and adequately informed of any offers of settle-
ment and any negotiations was later added by the court in Baker v. Northwestern Nat'l
Casualty Co., 22 Wis. 2d 77, 83, 125 N.W.2d 370, 373 (1963). See also Brown v. Guar-
antee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, -, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957) (explaining factors to
be considered in determining insurer's good faith settlement).
23. 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
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first-party claim situations. The court in Anderson reasoned:
"The rationale which recognizes an ancillary duty on an in-
surance company to exercise good faith in the settlement of
third-party claims is equally applicable and of equal impor-
tance when the insured seeks payment of legitimate damages
from his own insurance company. ' 24 In addition, the court
clarified some tangential issues by defining bad faith as an in-
tentional tort25 and distinguishing bad faith from a tortious
breach of contract.2 6
III. THE MOWRY OPINIONS
A. The Majority
Justice Ceci, writing for the majority, concluded that
Badger State neither breached its contractual duty to defend
nor committed bad faith in refusing to settle Mowry's claim
within policy limits. 27 In reaching this decision, the court rea-
soned that because the duty to settle is dependent upon cover-
age, the duty to settle becomes doubtful when a coverage
question arises.28
The court addressed the strict-liability approach adopted
in a line of California cases relied on by Mowry to support his
claim against Badger State.29 The court, however, declared its
unwillingness to adopt the theory which mandates holding an
24. Id. at 688, 271 N.W.2d at 375.
25. Id. at 691, 271 N.W.2d at 376. The court stated that because bad faith is an
intentional tort, punitive damages would be appropriate in certain circumstances. Id. at
697, 271 N.W.2d at 379. Traditionally, an insurer's breach of duty to settle a third-
party claim exposed it to liability in the amount of the excess judgment against the
insured; some courts have been allowing recovery beyond the excess judgment for
mental suffering and punitive damages. Note, supra note 3, at 392.
26. Anderson, 85 Wis. 2d at 687, 271 N.W.2d at 374. The court had previously
identified the bad faith conduct of an insurer as a "tortious breach of contract" in Drake
v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 977, 983, 236 N.W.2d 204, 208 (1975).
27. Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 129 Wis. 2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171
(1986).
28. Id. at 511, 385 N.W.2d at 178.
29. See Luke v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1972);
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (establishing
strict liability on the part of the insurer, regardless of good faith considerations). See
generally Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment - A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REV.
775 (1976) (discussing insurer bad faith in California).
1987]
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insurer strictly liable for any judgment in excess of policy lim-
its, regardless of good faith considerations. 30
After rejecting a strict liability cause of action against in-
surers, the court analyzed what constitutes bad faith on the
part of an insurer. Applying the standards of bad faith set
forth in both Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.,3 I a first-
party claim case, and Johnson v. American Family Mutual In-
surance Co.,32 a third-party claim case, the court maintained
that "[b]ad faith should be found in this case only if there was
no fairly debatable coverage question. ' 33 Accordingly, the
court ruled that Badger State was presented with a fairly de-
batable coverage issue and therefore did not commit bad faith
in failing to settle Mowry's claims within policy limits. 34
The court then turned to the question of whether Badger
State breached its contract with McCarthy in refusing to de-
fend him. The court stated that once the policy coverage issue
was resolved, Badger State did in fact provide McCarthy with
the defense it was required to provide. 35 According to the
court, Badger State was not obligated to extend a free defense
to McCarthy before resolving the coverage issue merely be-
cause the trial was bifurcated. 36  The court's determination
that Badger State did not breach its duty to defend eliminated
the need for any discussion of the appropriate measure of
damages.37
30. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 514, 385 N.W.2d at 180.
31. 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978). The court stated, "Under these tests
of the torts of bad faith, an insurance company, however, may challenge claims which
are fairly debatable and will be found liable only where it has intentionally denied (or
failed to process or pay) a claim without a reasonable basis." Id. at 693, 271 N.W.2d at
377.
32. 93 Wis. 2d 633, 287 N.W.2d 729 (1980). The court here stated that it is not bad
faith for an insurer to refuse to settle a victim's claim "under the bona fide belief that
the insurer might defeat the action." Id. at 646, 287 N.W.2d at 736.
33. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 517, 385 N.W.2d at 181.
34. Id. at 520-21, 385 N.W.2d at 182.
35. Id. at 527-30, 385 N.W.2d at 185-86. The duty to defend, unlike the duty to
settle, is a contractual issue. The applicable clause in Badger State's policy provided,
" '[T]he company shall, with counsel of its choice, defend any suit alleging such bodily
injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of
this policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent.
Id. at 528, 385 N.W.2d at 185.




B. Justice Abrahamson's Dissent
Justice Abrahamson dissented, stating several policy argu-
ments to support her contention that the insurer, not the in-
sured, should bear the loss resulting from the insurer's
decision not to settle within policy limits.3" Justice Abraham-
son noted that while Badger State's decision may not have
been made in bad faith, it was still an erroneous one subjecting
the insured to risk of loss. 39
To further buttress her argument, Justice Abrahamson
noted that the insurer is often in a better position than the
insured to pay. Furthermore, the insurer can protect itself
from liability in excess of policy limits by litigating the issue of
coverage promptly, before a settlement offer is made.
40
Additionally, Justice Abrahamson argued for the govern-
ance of basic contract principles.41 She stated that Badger
State actually had an insurance contract with McCarthy, and
its refusal to pay based on its belief that no coverage existed
should accordingly be viewed as a breach of contract.42 Based
on this rationale, Badger State should be required to pay the
necessary damages to place its insured in the same position he
would have been in had the insurance company performed its
part of the insurance contract.43
C. Justice Steinmetz's Concurrence
Justice Steinmetz, in a concurring opinion, emphatically
stated that the duty to settle is not a contractual duty, but
rather a fiduciary one.44 Justice Steinmetz asserted that this
duty arises only when the insurer assumes the exclusive man-
agement and control of its insured's defense.45 Consequently,
because Badger State did not assume McCarthy's defense un-
38. Id. at 537-41, 385 N.W.2d at 189-90 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 538, 385 N.W.2d at 190.
40. Id. at 540-41, 385 N.W.2d at 190-91.
41. Id. at 539, 385 N.W.2d at 190.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 530-37, 385 N.W.2d at 186-89 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 532-35, 385 N.W.2d at 187-88 (citing Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co.,
204 Wis. 1, 13-14, 235 N.W. 413, 414 (1931); Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 60 Wis. 2d 224, 227, 208 N.W.2d 442, 443 (1973)).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
til after the coverage trial, the duty to settle was never
triggered.46
Justice Steinmetz also refuted the dissent's assertion that
the insured cannot adequately protect his own interests when
the insurer refuses to defend.4 7 Instead, he maintained that
when an insurer refuses to defend, the insured possesses the
authority to reasonably settle his own claim.48 Justice Stein-
metz further noted that because the insured in the case at bar
did not mitigate his damages by negotiating a settlement him-
self, he would not be entitled to recover any excess judgment
from Badger State.49
IV. CRITIQUE
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Mowry v.
Badger State Mutual Casualty Co. 50 did not deviate from es-
tablished Wisconsin case law, it disregarded grave policy con-
cerns likely to arise in the wake of this decision. As Justice
Abrahamson noted in her dissent, the court in Mowry failed to
recognize that an insurer's decision, though apparently lack-
ing in bad faith motivation, may nevertheless be an erroneous
one.
51
The court neglected to justify the inequity of forcing the
loss resulting from an insurer's erroneous decision on the in-
sured. Because this case addresses a previously unchartered
area of insurance law,5 2 the court should have more thor-
oughly contemplated the likely impact of its decision on the
46. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 535, 385 N.W.2d at 188 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 535, 385 N.W.2d at 188-89.
48. Id. at 535-37, 385 N.W.2d at 188-89 (citing United States Guar. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Wis. 317, 321, 12 N.W.2d 59, 60-61 (1943)).
49. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 536, 385 N.W.2d at 189 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
Justice Steinmetz concluded his concurring opinion with his belief that Mowry knew
that he could only recover full compensation for his injuries if McCarthy had a bad
faith claim against Badger State. Id. at 537, 385 N.W.2d at 189. Therefore, Mowry
tried to settle only with Badger State and not with the insured because he knew Badger
State would not settle before the coverage trial. Id.
50. 129 Wis. 2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986).
51. Justice Abrahamson noted this point in her dissent. Id. at 538, 385 N.W.2d at
190 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
52. Prior cases in this area have not dealt with an insurer rejecting settlement offers
because of a coverage question. The court in Mowry stated, lt]he [appellate] court
noted that this particular scenario presents an unaddressed area of insurance law in this
state." 129 Wis. 2d at 508, 385 N.W.2d at 177.
(Vol. 70:725
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insured. First, the outcome of Mowry does not comport with
the everyday understanding of insurance. As Justice Abra-
hamson stated, "[t]he policyholder buys insurance to avoid
the risk of loss."53 However, with Mowry as precedent, every
policyholder will be exposed to the risk of an excess judgment
resulting from an insurer's erroneous decision not to settle.
Second, in light of this decision, it would not be surprising if
policyholders try to protect themselves by purchasing more
expensive coverage with higher policy limits.
The implications of Mowry would be less troubling had the
majority given equal deference to the competing interests of
both the insurer and insured. Instead, the court engaged in a
rather one-sided analysis, giving disproportionate weight to
the interests of the insurer. For example, in declaring its re-
fusal to adopt California's theory of strict liability, the court
explained, "[s]uch a policy is unduly oppressive on insurance
companies and would force them to settle claims where cover-
age may be dubious. 5 4 However, the court did not explain
how the strict liability doctrine could protect the insured and
why the insurer's interests should supersede the insured's
interests.
Alternatively, the dissenting opinion embodies the consid-
erations that should have been included in the majority's anal-
ysis. In her dissent, Justice Abrahamson recognized that
Badger State's decision, even if not made in bad faith, was still
an erroneous one which would impose a loss on one of the
parties." She noted the apparent injustice of forcing this bur-
den on either party; thus, she stated that fairness dictates that
a determination then be made of which party is in a better
position to bear the loss. 56 Unlike the majority, Justice Abra-
hamson considered the interests of both the insurer and in-
53. Id. at 538, 385 N.W.2d at 190 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). In Barrera v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456 P.2d 674, 682, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106,
114 (1969), the court stated, "[t]he reasonable expectation of both the public and the
insured is that the insurer will duly perform its basic commitment: to provide
insurance."
54. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 514, 385 N.W.2d at 180. But see Rova Farms Resort,
Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 500, 323 A.2d 495, 510 (1974) (explaining that a
strict liability approach would best protect the insured).
55. Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 538, 385 N.W.2d at 190 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 538-40, 385 N.W.2d at 190-91.
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sured in arriving at her ultimate decision that the insurer
should shoulder this responsibility.17
Justice Steinmetz, in a fairly thorough opinion, correctly
asserted that the duty to settle is not a contractual duty, as the
dissent claimed, but rather a fiduciary duty. 8 Justice Stein-
metz explained that this fiduciary duty arises only when the
insurer undertakes the management and control of the in-
sured's case.59 Contrary to Justice Steinmetz's adamant belief
that this duty never arose on the part of Badger State,6 ° the
record in Mowry indicates that the issue is at least debatable.
The evidence in Mowry reflects a fairly high degree of involve-
ment by Badger State. Badger State thoroughly investigated
the case, participated in the decision to hold a bifurcated trial,
and received and responded to offers of settlement.6'
Justice Steinmetz further noted that the insured must pro-
tect his interests by negotiating a settlement himself.62 How-
ever, it seems unlikely that an insured can adequately protect
his interests when the distinction between his duties and the
insurer's duties becomes blurred. In Mowry, Badger State
monitored and participated in the defense of the claim, and
yet its insured, probably not as familiar with the case, was
expected to know that it was his duty to accept a settlement
from the injured party.
Finally, the court seemed to place undue emphasis on Wis-
consin's bifurcation statute63 to support its position. Indeed,
the court maintained that the California approach would be
unacceptable in light of this statute.64 While the statute may
protect an insurer from being pressured to settle a claim where
coverage is uncertain, the statute does not ameliorate the
harshness of a judgment in excess of policy limits against the
insured when the insurer is wrong.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 530-37, 385 N.W.2d at 186-89 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 532-35, 385 N.W.2d at 187-88.
60. Id. at 535, 385 N.W.2d at 188.
61. Id. at 505-08, 385 N.W.2d at 176-77.
62. Id. at 535, 385 N.W.2d at 188-89. (Steinmetz, J., concurring). See Keeton,
supra note 12, at 1153-58 for a discussion of the insured's duty to mitigate damages.
63. WIs. STAT. § 803.04(2)(b) (1985-86). See supra note 4 for the language of this
statute.




While the majority's analysis of the bad faith issue in
Mowry v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co. 65 is in keeping
with Wisconsin case law, the outcome of Mowry is an inequi-
table one. The rationale of Mowry mandates that an insured
pay the consequences of an insurer's mistaken judgment. The
insurer should be given the prerogative of not settling where
coverage is doubtful,66 but when the insurer is mistaken about
coverage, the insurer, not the insured, should pay for any re-
sulting loss.
Although the court recognized that imposing the loss on
the insurer would produce some unfavorable repercussions in
the insurance industry, the court neglected to likewise con-
template the implications of this decision on policyholders.
Mowry is likely not only to confound policyholders' basic un-
derstanding of insurance, but also to make policyholders feel
compelled to purchase insurance with higher limits. But even
with higher limits in force, policyholders should feel insecure
about the effectiveness of their coverage. As in Mowry, there
always exists the possibility of being liable for an excess judg-
ment due to an insurer's erroneous decision.
LISA E. WAISBREN
65. 129 Wis. 2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986).
66. Wis. STAT. § 803.04(2)(b) (1985-86) gives insurers this option.
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